Hay–Herrán Treaty

Hay–Herrán Treaty
Tomás Herrán and John M. Hay
Drafted	1901 to 1903
Signed	January 27, 1903
Location	Washington, D.C.
Signatories	Tomás Herrán and John M. Hay
Parties	Colombia U.S.

The Hay–Herrán Treaty is the name by which the international treaty is known that was signed between the Republic of Colombia and the United States through the designated plenipotentiaries, Secretary of State John Hay and the Colombian minister, Dr. Tomás Herrán, in Washington on January 22, 1903, for the purpose of building a transoceanic canal joining the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean across the Isthmus of Panama.

Commercial routes at the end of the 19th century would benefit greatly from the construction of a transoceanic canal taking advantage of the Central American isthmuses. After a long history of failed attempts, Panama was chosen as the final site of the canal, which would be built with American capital. The treaty was signed in the midst of political and economic events that marked its subsequent failed ratification.

The text of the treaty consists of 28 articles without higher-level divisions, accompanied by an annex that gives legitimacy to one of the signatories. The articles establish differentiated conditions for the course of the century-long concession, setting out provisions on the partial renunciation of sovereignty, financing, exploitation rights, and general provisions on its validity with respect to prior agreements.

The construction of an interoceanic canal was a necessity for the development of international trade. The country studied several projects and advanced some treaties to build it across the Isthmus of Panama. The last negotiation was with the United States of America, who saw in the area, more than a commercial possibility, a strategic geopolitical location. The agreement was set out in the Hay–Herrán Treaty, rejected by the Colombian Congress in 1903.

— Antonio José Uribe. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1901. Colombia.

Background

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At the end of the first half of the 19th century, according to the Cuban internationalist Raúl de Cárdenas, thanks to the successive acquisitions of Louisiana in 1803, Florida in 1819 and Texas in 1845, the United States became the owner of the entire northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico, occupying the former privileged position of Spain in what would then be called the American Mediterranean. But dominion over the geographic region was shared with Great Britain, which owned the Bahamas, the Lesser Antilles and Jamaica, and on the mainland part of the Guianas as well as Belize and the Mosquitos.

Most of these routes for an isthmian canal were investigated several times, and others, not shown on the map, were also proposed during the nearly four centuries over which the construction of the canal would be discussed. 1. Tehuantepec route. 2.–7. Nicaragua routes. 8. Chiriquí route. 9. Panama Canal route. 10. San Blass route. 11.–15. Caledonia and Darién routes. 16.–30. Atrato routes.

Although there was no immediate cause for rivalry, the construction of a canal that would speed transit between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific, an idea conceived almost from the very discovery, was an enterprise that would sooner or later pit the two powers against each other.

For its part, New Granada, not considering the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 a sufficient guarantee, harbored fear of England, owing to the seizure of the Falkland Islands from Argentina in 1770, and to the more recent appropriation of the Mosquitia, carried out by Sir Gregor MacGregor, who in 1824 named it "Namville Neustrie". Additionally, in 1825, the English seized the town of Bocas del Toro, imposing their sovereignty over part of what is today Panamanian soil and later establishing factories in the port of San Juan del Norte and on the Nicaraguan coast.

Because of the strategic importance of the Gulf of Darién, New Granada began in 1822 and 1826 to receive proposals to build an interoceanic canal through Panama, but none of them prospered owing to the conviction in Bogotá that the route should be built with its own resources and administered by local authorities.

Incidentally, in 1835, when the brig Beagle, on a scientific expedition under the command of the English Captain Henslow, whose crew included the later famous Charles Darwin, arrived at the Pearl Islands, the Granadans, wary as they were of the English, sent a garrison to guard the islands, which caused the Anglo-Saxons to cut their visit short.

By a resolution of March 3, 1835, the President of the United States was empowered to seek negotiations with Central America and New Granada in search of a route that would open Atlantic–Pacific transit, with the aim of universal navigation by all nations, stipulating reasonable tolls to remunerate the private corporations that might wish to undertake the construction of the infrastructure needed for that purpose. It was in this way that Colonel Charles Beagle was commissioned by the president at the time, Andrew Jackson, to carry out studies of the Nicaragua route, but he finally ended up obtaining a concession, previously granted to Baron Charles de Thierry, to build a railway connection along the Darién route (Isthmus of Panama), in negotiations with Bogotá. However, Mr. Beagle died before undertaking the project.

By a similar resolution, in 1839, President Martin Van Buren appointed John L. Stephens, with a mission similar to Beagle's; he ultimately recommended the route along the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua as the optimal path for the interoceanic canal, at a cost he estimated at US$25,000,000 of that era: thus it was established that only the Nicaragua and Panama routes would make the project viable. This determination, added to the California Gold Rush in the middle of the century and the wave of emigrants seeking safe routes to reach the Pacific, gave rise to an enduring rivalry between Panama and Nicaragua.

Given the facts indicating a British expansionist policy in the area, and feeling powerless to neutralize it, when the American government invited New Granada to conclude a Treaty of Peace, Navigation and Commerce, the latter considered it advisable. The Granadan intention was to guarantee sovereignty over the isthmus in perpetuity, placing it safe from French predominance and British ambitions.

Frontispiece of the Panama Railroad. 1857.

After fruitless efforts by American diplomacy, in 1846 the treaty was finally concluded, signed by the chargé d'affaires in Bogotá, Benjamin A. Bidlack, and the Secretary of Foreign Relations of New Granada, Manuel María Mallarino. This treaty expressed the intention to undertake the construction of a canal in the future, and its navigation with equal rights of way between Granadan and American citizens, and it guaranteed that New Granada would be sovereign over its territory. On June 10, 1848, when the ratifications of the Bogotá treaty were exchanged in Washington, several powers protested, among them Great Britain, which then claimed rights over Nicaragua.

Despite infringing the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, by overlooking the recent occupation of Tigre Island by the British, a terminal point of a possible canal route, and against growing popular American indignation, General Taylor, in a conciliatory spirit, sought and finally agreed upon a treaty with Great Britain, the Clayton–Bulwer, ratified in July 1850, which would provoke bitter controversy in the decades to come; for many, the agreement merely legitimized the existing status quo with regard to British appropriations in Central America.

In May 1850, construction of the railway across the Isthmus of Panama began, carried out by the consortium "Panama Railroad Company", under an exclusive arrangement with New Granada, stipulating a period of operations by the corporation of forty-nine years from the date of completion of the work, which would be finished in January 1855. This railway would be the forerunner of the canal, opening up the stretch of virgin jungle necessary to connect the two oceans.

In his work El ferrocarril de Panamá y su Historia, Professor Ernesto Castillero Pimental would assert:

The history of the Panama Railroad is intimately linked with that of the interoceanic canal, in whose opening it was an extremely powerful element. The interests that demanded the work of the one were those that determined that of the other.

Subsequently, the United States also secured its rights over the route across the isthmus of Nicaragua, with the Ayon–Dickinson Treaty, signed with that State on June 21, 1867.

On the other hand, and even though no article of the Mallarino–Bidlack Treaty implied the right to land American troops on the territory of the isthmus without prior notice, much less when they were intended to carry out military maneuvers or other operations, owing to its interpretation of Article 35, from the time it came into force and over the next 50 years the United States carried out military interventions, for the purpose of preserving order, a total of fifteen times, the most critical being that of 1856, provoked by the watermelon slice incident, and that of 1862, in which, at the request of the Governor of Panama, General Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera was prevented from entering Panama on an official mission.

The transit of United States troops through the territory of Panama, as well as arms trafficking by the Transisthmian Railroad Company in collaboration with American shipping corporations, supposedly devoted solely to the transport of passengers and mail, became a new permanent source of conflicts and contradictions and one of the elements that would intensify political, social and economic instability in Colombia in the following decades.

On January 26, 1870, the United States of Colombia and the United States signed the Arosemena, Sánchez–Hurlbut treaty, in which Colombia granted the U.S. a period of three years to study the terrain of the isthmus, five years to begin the works and fifteen to complete the canal, ceding two hundred thousand hectares of unpopulated land to the U.S. for that purpose, counting from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; this treaty was never submitted to the United States Congress for approval.

In 1878, Colombia accepted a proposal from Lucien N. B. Wyse on behalf of the Civil Society of the Interoceanic Canal, of French origin, to build the route across the Isthmus of Panama. Later the prerogative was acquired by Count Ferdinand de Lesseps, who constituted the Compagnie Universalle pour le Canal Interoceanic, which eventually, in order to reduce costs, acquired the Panama Railway Company, and began the work in 1883.

New Universal Interoceanic Canal Company at the foot of Cerro de Oro in the Culebra Cut (later Gaillard). 1896.

Although the compensatory rights of way in exchange for the guarantee of sovereignty in favor of the United States had already been endorsed in the protocol of February 22, 1879, signed in Bogotá by Secretary of Foreign Relations Pablo Arosamena and Mr. Ernesto Dichnan, minister in Colombia, this decision by Colombia caused the Washington chancellery to angrily reject any intention the European governments might harbor of guaranteeing the Panama Canal, in a note of protest sent by Secretary of State James G. Blaine in June 1881 to Paris, London, Berlin and Vienna.

The completion of the works was forecast for 1889, but when the deadline arrived only one fifth had been completed. De Lesseps had made engineering errors, such as planning a sea-level canal and underestimating the wet and waterlogged land of Panama, but there were also plagues such as tuberculosis, yellow fever and malaria that would decimate a large part of the workers. In December 1889, the French company went bankrupt and De Lesseps had no choice but to announce the failure of "la grande enterprise".

In Law 107 of the Republic of December 26, 1890, endorsing the Roldan–Wyse Contract of December 10, Colombia granted the first extension, for ten years, giving until February 28, 1893, for the formation of a new company to resume the construction of the canal, in exchange for ten million francs in five annual installments, plus five million francs in shares of the new company.

In Bogotá, on April 4, 1893, the agreement of December 26 was modified by means of the Suarez–Mange Contract, in which two million francs were added to the figures previously stipulated in the Roldan–Wyse contract; the conditions of amortization of the debt were modified, allowing the deduction of four million francs that the Colombian Government and the Treasurer of the Department of Panama owed to the company in liquidation for a loan of 1883; and a deadline for the constitution of the new company was granted, until October 31, 1894.

Finally, on October 20, 1894, with a capital of sixty million francs, the New French Universal Interoceanic Canal Company was constituted; this capital was obtained through public subscription, favorable rulings in lawsuits brought against companies or persons who had illegally profited from the extravagances of the old company, and the sale of shares, and the company began operations immediately afterwards.

The war of the routes

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Main article: Nicaragua Canal

If the Americans decided to build the canal through Nicaragua, the French would lose their investment, close to 250 million dollars. On January 26, 1896, the president of the New Canal Company, Maurice Hautin, had turned to the services of William Nelson Cromwell, a skillful and versatile New York lawyer who had been general counsel of the Panama Railroad Company since 1893 and who wielded significant influence in the upper circles of Washington, in order to convince the U.S. to buy the rights of the French company, which was going through economic difficulties. Cromwell informed him that the American government was convinced that building a canal through Panama was a chimerical enterprise and that its realization was impossible.

Caricature from the New York Herald on the debate over building a canal through Nicaragua or Panama, alluding to Buridan's ass. Circa 1900.

In early 1898, with a conflagration between the United States and Spain already imminent, the U.S. sent the battleship Oregon to join the Atlantic fleet. Departing from San Francisco and rounding Cape Horn to reach its objective, the battleship would take two months to arrive at its destination, covering 13,500 nautical miles, in order to take part in the bombardment of Santiago de Cuba.

When Cromwell traveled to Washington on December 2, 1898, he found that politicians and businessmen had already decided to build the Nicaragua canal, and he even found decrees stipulating the creation of the Maritime Canal Co., a private company, to build the canal along that route. Senator John Tyler Morgan, of Lousiana, championed the project in this regard.

Although Cromwell had requested and held a meeting with President McKinley, expressing his interests to him, contrary to his advice and in the wake of the experience of the Oregon, on December 7, 1898, President William McKinley declared in a message to Congress how imperative control of east–west transit was for the expansion of commercial and continental power, reaffirming Senator Morgan's project.

Meeting with a curt rejection from Senator Morgan, Cromwell turned to his connections in the Republican Party, to whose campaigns he had made significant donations, lambasting them for allowing the canal construction projects to be led by the Democrats.

At a meeting with the director of the Republican Party, Mark Hanna, who at that time did not support the canal across the Isthmus of Panama, as he was protecting the interests of the Railroad Company, which saw that enterprise as strong competition, Cromwell offered him a donation of sixty thousand dollars on behalf of the Compagnie Nouvelle, to which Mr. Hanna, without much hesitation, agreed.

William Nelson Cromwell. 1904.

Cromwell's maneuvers were denounced by Senator Morgan both in the Senate and in the press. But Cromwell took his revenge by influencing a bill that his friend William P. Hepburn would submit for approval to the House of Representatives at the end of February, in which care had been taken not to mention a preferred route, while at the same time casting a shadow of doubt over the project with the Maritime Canal Co., stripping Morgan and the Democrats of the credit.

Morgan counterattacked, presenting his own initiative, which resulted in a deadlock in Congress. Cromwell suggested that, in order to resolve the impasse, a commission be appointed to evaluate the most appropriate route for the construction of the canal. To the astonishment of public opinion and of the supporters of the Nicaragua canal, the Republicans adopted Cromwell's suggestion and withheld that year's budget until their bill was approved, leaving Morgan and the Democrats no option but to accept their designs.

Thus, in March 1899, Congress enacted a law for the necessary economic and feasibility studies to be carried out once again in order to determine which of the isthmuses, that of Nicaragua or that of Panama, would be more favorable for the construction of the canal, bearing in mind that by then it was already foreseen that the New French Company would not have sufficient funds to complete the work. For this purpose the corresponding powers were granted to the President to appoint a commission and carry out what the law thus provided. One million dollars from the Treasury reserve was budgeted for this task. However, before the commission was formed, several bills were already under way that gave broad powers to the executive to build the canal through Nicaragua.

It was at this moment that the discussion on the inconvenience of the Clayton–Bulwer Treaty with England became relevant again, since that treaty, still being in force, conferred equal rights and authority to both nations over whichever route might eventually host the interoceanic canal.

In April 1900, the French made arrangements to negotiate another extension, deferring the deadline for the completion of the canal until October 31, 1910; this extension was granted by Colombian President Manuel Antonio Sanclemente, according to Legislative Decree No. 721 of April 1900, in exchange for $1,000,000, without the consent of Congress. The New French Canal Company in reality had no other intention than to keep the concession in force in the hope of selling it to the U.S.

Senator Mark Hanna. 1901.

However, in the negotiations of the Hay–Herrán Treaty, this agreement was dismissed by Colombia, and the date of the previous extension, October 31, 1904, was held up as the only one in force, after which all the rights and properties of the canal would return to the hands of the South American country.

John Hay, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, would sign a treaty with the British ambassador Lord Julian Pauncefote on February 5, 1900, in order to supersede the Clayton–Bulwer Treaty. Theodore Roosevelt, who was then Governor of New York, addressed Hay in a cordial letter criticizing two particular points of the treaty: first, the prohibition on fortifying the canal, and second, the invitation extended to foreign powers to guarantee the canal, which in his opinion would tend to invalidate the Monroe Doctrine.

Submitted for ratification before the Senate, it was rejected with amendments reflecting Roosevelt's objections, which in turn were rejected by the British government. In the face of this situation, Hay flew into a rage and resigned his post. However, McKinley, in a strongly worded letter, did not accept his resignation.

Thus Hay began to work on another treaty, leaving the incident behind. Meanwhile Roosevelt had become president, and the new treaty, known as the second Hay–Pauncefote Treaty, was signed on November 18, 1901, ratified by the Senate by 72 votes in favor vs. 6 against, and accepted by the British government: the way for the construction of the canal, under absolute American control, was thus cleared.

Meanwhile, on May 26, 1901, a rumor began to circulate in Paris that 16 American businessmen had signed an agreement to speculate with the shares of the Compagnie Nouvelle, and that they planned to surreptitiously acquire the shares of the company's subscribers throughout the country, supposing that for this purpose they would need only 5 million dollars, but that they could resell them to the U.S. for more than 40.

Hutin sent Eugene Oppenheim as an emissary to investigate the matter, and he learned of Cromwell's donation to Senator Hanna, in the name of the French company, without its consent. For this reason, on July 1, 1901, Hutin would send a letter to Cromwell announcing his dismissal as representative of the Compagnie Nouvelle. Cromwell's dismissal would have immediate effects.

The evaluation commission, which had taken office on June 15, 1899, under the direction of Admiral John G. Walker, taking into account the latest extension until 1910 for the completion of the work, which Colombia had granted to the New Canal Company, and the unacceptable sum of $109,141,500 that the company had demanded for its assets, and considering a direct arrangement with that company unachievable, would make known, in a report of November 30, 1901, that:

The most practicable and feasible route for an isthmian canal to be under the control, management and ownership of the United States is that known as the Nicaragua route.

The Walker commission had valued the assets of the Compagnie Nouvelle as follows:

Item	Amount
Excavation already carried out	$27,474,033
Par value of Panama Railroad shares	$6,850,000
Maps, drawings and records	$2,000,000
Total	$36,324,033
To which, with ten percent added to cover omissions, make the cost of the Panama Canal (sic)	$40,000,000

The construction of the Panama Canal would cost $253 million ($144 million to finish the canal plus $109 million for the rights of the French), while the canal through Nicaragua would cost $189 million, according to the estimates.

On January 9, 1902, the Hepburn Bill, committing the U.S. to the Nicaragua route, was approved in the House of Representatives by 309 votes in favor vs. 2 against.

The volcano stamp

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Philippe Bunau-Varilla as Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama. Prince, Washington.

Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French soldier of ambitious nature with studies in engineering, had devoted his life to laying the foundations of the Panama Canal. Through a controversial subcontract with the Compagnie Universalle, he managed to amass a fortune. When the Compagnie Universalle went bankrupt he was accused of fraud and sentenced to buy 400,000 dollars in shares of the Compagnie Nouvelle.

He, together with his brother Maurice, owned 11,000 shares, which meant that if the U.S. bought the concession of the Compagnie Nouvelle, the Bunau-Varillas would increase their fortune significantly. From 1900 he had traveled to New York, promoting the route of the Panama Canal, and he even met with John Tylor Morgan at the latter's house in Washington in 1901, where he had a heated dispute that made its way into the press.

After the Walker commission recommended the Nicaragua option on November 30, on December 1 Hay signed protocols with the ministers of Nicaragua and Costa Rica to negotiate the canal treaties as soon as the president was authorized by Congress to acquire the routes crossing their territories. Since Cromwell was no longer participating in the lobbying, all initiatives depended on Bunau-Varilla.

When Bunau-Varilla returned to Paris he launched a strong diatribe against the then president of the company, Maurice Hutin, and the board, causing a scandal that ended in his dismissal; he was replaced by a mutual friend of Cromwell and Bunau-Varilla, Maurice Bo, president of the Crédit Lyonnais bank. Two days later, on January 4, 1902, the new board would send a cablegram to Washington reducing to $40,000,000 its demand for the sale of the concession and its assets.

Senator John C. Spooner, responsible for the Spooner decree (Spooner Act).

On January 14, when J. T. Morgan was about to present his bill, he was unexpectedly interrupted by Senator Hanna, who stated that Roosevelt, who had recently taken office after McKinley's assassination, had summoned the Walker commission and that accordingly Morgan should wait for the president to approve the report.

In that week of Monday, January 14, 1902, President Roosevelt asked the Walker commission to reconsider its decision, on a motion to Senator Morison, in light of the change in conditions brought about at the last minute by the offer of the Compagnie Nouvelle to sell its assets for $40 million. Roosevelt required a unanimous decision, and made it clear that he expected the commission to accept the offer of the Canal Company. Although Noble, Pasco and Professor Hauft were initially reluctant, they ended up accepting.

At the same time, the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals, appointing six members to study the report with respect to the legal aspects involved in the transfer of the New Company's property, judged that its title was defective and that it had no power to be transferred.

It was finally decided that the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals would not issue its verdict until all the members of the isthmian canal commission had appeared to testify. This delay would allow negotiations between the Company, the U.S. and the Republic of Colombia to reach a settlement on the matter of the title.

The Walker commission would report on January 18, 1902, that "in view of changed conditions, that of Panama will be the most feasible and practicable route".

It is not clear why Roosevelt decided on the Panama route, but it was the most important decision at the inauguration of his government.

Stamp from the 1900 print run, which Bunau-Varilla would distribute among the senators when the proposal for the Panama route prevailed over that of Nicaragua, showing Mount Momotombo in eruption.

After seven months of suspension, on January 27, the new administration of the Compagnie Nouvelle renewed the advisory services of William N. Cromwell, making explicit that no "donations or promises could be made to anyone that might compromise the company." His first strategy was to induce Senator Hanna to delay the presentation in the Senate of the Hepburn bill, which had passed the House on January 9.

On the basis of the supplementary report of the Isthmian Commission, Senator John C. Spooner, at the request of Roosevelt, added an amendment to the Hepburn bill on January 28 to acquire in perpetuity control over a 6-mile strip of the Republic of Colombia, providing for "the acquisition of the rights, privileges, franchises, concessions, right of way, unfinished work, machinery and property of the New Panama Canal Company of France for 40 million, and the construction of the canal across the Isthmus of Panama; but if the president should be unable to obtain for the United States valid title to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia, within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then the president could reconsider the option of the Nicaragua canal."

1902 was an unusual year for volcanic activity on the planet. On May 14, a cablegram arrived from New Orleans announcing that a violent earthquake had shaken the shores of Lake Managua, adjacent to Nicaragua, and that the Momotombo volcano had erupted, destroying piers of the town of Momotombo, at the terminal of the railroad that ran from the lake to Corinto, on the Pacific.

This caricature would appear in the New York Herald, showing the U.S. decision to build the canal across the Isthmus of Panama. A Frenchman rides a little donkey, carrying a "Teddy Bear", a synonym for Roosevelt at that time.

On May 20, Pelée erupted for the second time, wiping out what remained of St. Pierre, and on the island of Saint Vincent, south of Martinique, another volcano became active.

To clarify these events, on June 3, at Morgan's request, the minister of Nicaragua, Luis Correa, delivered to him a cable from President José Santos Zelaya that read:

THE NEWS PUBLISHED ABOUT RECENT VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS AND EARTHQUAKES IN NICARAGUA IS COMPLETELY FALSE.

In the introductory letter, the minister added that Nicaragua had not had episodes of volcanic eruptions since 1835, when the Conseguina had released emissions of gas and ash but no lava. Although it is impossible to determine whether Correa really received the cable from the president or was responsible for the information he sent to Morgan, Momotombo had indeed erupted.

Bunau-Varilla immediately notified all the senators that Nicaragua could suffer the same fate. He knew that the Nicaraguan government had issued a print run of postage stamps showing the imposing Momotombo spewing lava. The Frenchman bought a good quantity of these stamps from the dealer in New York and placed them in the senators' compartments with the note: "Official testimony of volcanic activity in Nicaragua", during the sessions debating the Spooner amendment, during which Senator Hanna, who had not forgotten an earlier promise by the French of $250,000 for the campaign of the Republican Party, stood up straight brandishing one of the stamps, asking his colleagues whether they would be so foolish as to build a canal in the shadow of that volcano.

On June 19, 1902, the Spooner amendment passed by 42 votes in favor vs. 34 against. Senator Morgan introduced a substitute measure to authorize the selection of the Nicaragua route, which was defeated 41:23. The Spooner decree was approved 67:6. The House was not satisfied with the Spooner decree, but a conference was convened that reported on June 25, advising the House to ratify the decree. The House did so, approving the decree by 260:8. President Roosevelt signed the decree on June 30, 1902, which thus became law: the Spooner Law (Spooner Act). As the next step, the U.S. would seek a definitive agreement with the Republic of Colombia.

The legation

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For much of the time while the Panama route was being negotiated with the U.S., Colombia was living through one of its most devastating civil wars, later known as the Thousand Days' War. Bogotá was still a city isolated from the rest of the world. In the whole country there were no more than 700 km of railway track, and reaching Bogotá from Buenaventura or Barranquilla required two weeks to a month of hazardous journeys. "Because of its isolation, the echoes of the outside world that reached it were weakened by distance", Bunau-Varilla would write.

The vice president, José Manuel Marroquín, had led a coup d'état against his presidential running mate, Manuel Antonio Sanclemente, in an episode known as el cuartelazo, and he was seen as an inflexible despot from the rostrums of Washington.

In order to finance the war, the government had requested multiple loans from foreign countries and was in ruin. The only hope was that the canal would be built along the Panamanian route, and that the commerce and bonanza the enterprise would bring to the country would provide sufficient funds to remedy the fiscal deficit. However, on beginning negotiations, Colombia was not prepared to deal with Washington or to stem the relentless lobbying of the figures of Wall Street.

The talks between Colombia and the U.S. were surrounded by a tense and stressful atmosphere. In the final stages of the negotiations, Roosevelt, being a rough man, referred to Marroquín as the pithecanthropus and even went so far as to insult the Colombians by calling them contemptible little creatures, among other insults.

Efforts of Dr. Carlos Martínez Silva

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During the studies of the Walker commission, Cromwell came to learn that, according to Article 21 of the Salgar–Wyse contract with Colombia, the Compagnie Nouvelle was barred from transferring its rights to a foreign country, which led him to consider it a priority to overcome this obstacle so that such rights could be transferred.

Carlos Martínez Silva, first member of the Legation for the discussion of the treaty.

During this period there was no representation of Colombia in Washington, all business being handled by the consul general, Mr. Arturo de Brigard, from New York. Through Brigard, in an interview held in December 1900, Marroquín was asked to send a minister with the necessary powers to resolve the difficulty.

On the 23rd of the same month, Marroquín telegraphed, confirming that Dr. Carlos Martínez Silva, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, would be sent at the end of January 1901 to take charge of the matter.

Martínez Silva, on his arrival on March 2, 1901, got in touch with Cromwell, and through a series of interviews with him and his team set out to them the Colombian position, according to which opinion was against the transfer by the New Company, but the administration would consider the possibility on the condition that the terms of the negotiation were sufficiently beneficial to Colombia.

According to instructions issued by the Colombian government, Martínez Silva was to report to the administration in order to obtain a special prior authorization from the government for any delicate decision he had to make.

Martínez Silva considered that if the Hay–Pauncefote Treaty were approved, the negotiations would be futile, since, with Colombia unwilling to cede its sovereignty, the U.S. would discard the option of the Isthmus of Panama and negotiate the Nicaragua route.

Another issue that came up was Colombia's threat to repudiate the extension of the concession until 1910 that had been granted to the Canal company. This extension had been made in the absence of Colombia's best international lawyer, Dr. Nicolás Esguerra, and signed by the nephew of Rafael Reyes, Clímaco Calderón Reyes, then Minister of Finance in the government of Sanclemente.

On April 29, 1901, Martínez Silva lifted the prohibition stipulated in the Salgar–Wyse contract regarding the impossibility of transferring the rights of the Compagnie Nouvelle to any foreign country, in negotiations with the president of the company, on the condition that the terms of the negotiations and treaties with the U.S. were satisfactory to Colombia.

However, these efforts were in vain, since the Walker commission, in its first report, decided on the Nicaragua canal, given the unacceptable price that the Compagnie Nouvelle submitted for the transfer of its assets.

When the Compagnie Nouvelle lowered the price to the $40,000,000 at which the Walker commission had estimated its assets, and when the commission was preparing to deliver its second report, on January 8, 1902, Martínez Silva wrote to the government, recommending that Colombia should demand from the canal company $2,000,000, in addition to the $1,000,000 it had paid for the 6-year extension, should the project across the Isthmus of Panama be chosen.

Martínez Silva was accused by his government of having exceeded his powers in authorizing the negotiations between the canal company and the United States, and was removed from his post.

In a letter sent to Marroquín by Martínez Silva on March 11, 1902, other factors of Colombian domestic politics that influenced the decision can be seen, as this excerpt shows:

You tell me that the opinion among "the men who effectively and unconditionally support your government" is not, for now, favorable to me, thereby giving me clearly to understand that this is another reason that has weighed in your mind to remove me from the post I have held. There are three charges that that group formulates against me, and which you point out to me: that I am a political friend of Santiago Samper; that I decidedly opposed, as a member of the Government, the intervention in the Venezuela affair and the purchase of ships; and that I have shown myself too favorable to Uribe Uribe.

Martínez Silva died shortly after his return to Colombia, in Tunja, after having served a prison sentence in Gachalá for signing a protest against the execution of Liberals by firing squad, unleashing rumors that he had been the victim of the hatred generated by his devotion to the cause of the canal.

Efforts of José Vicente Concha

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Main article: José Vicente Concha

On February 28, 1902, Colombia had declared, through its consul in Paris, that it was not willing to allow the title of the Canal Company to be transferred.

José Vicente Concha would replace Carlos Martínez Silva as ambassador plenipotentiary.

Colombia sought to charge the company 50 to 60 million francs for giving its approval, or else to annul the extension until 1910, or, should the preceding plans fail, to wait until 1910 to expropriate the company's assets.

As Martínez Silva's replacement, José Vicente Concha was appointed, a political rival of his who was serving as Minister of War in the government of Marroquín, and who would arrive in New York on February 26, 1902.

There being at that moment no proposal of any kind pending between the United States and Colombia, the negotiations over the transfer of the title had stalled. On the pretext of awaiting instructions from Colombia, Concha avoided for a time presenting his credentials in Washington.

After trying in vain to get Concha to take the reins of the negotiations without further delay, Cromwell traveled to New York and convinced him that the Nicaragua project would be adopted if Colombia did not neutralize the devastating effects of the Paris declaration.

On March 7, 1902, Concha consented to the issuance of a communiqué clarifying that the notification of February 28 did not imply opposition to the transfer of the title, provided that Colombia and the U.S. reached a satisfactory agreement regarding its rights over the canal.

Finally, Concha presented his credentials on March 8, 1902. Next, Cromwell devoted himself day and night to drafting a treaty together with Concha, based on the draft that Martínez Silva had prepared, known as the memorandum.

As of March 27, 1902, Concha's best proposal was $7,500,000 in cash, annuities of $600,000 after 15 years from the completion of the works, the limitation of U.S. authority over the zone, and that the contract be for a fixed term. Minister Concha had arrived with instructions to demand $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 in cash and annuities of $1,000,000.

After further negotiations, it was agreed that the annual pecuniary remuneration would be decided by the Hague Peace Tribunal, and that the term of the contract would be one hundred years, renewable.

On March 29 the draft of what would later be called the Hay–Concha Treaty was ready, and it was presented for evaluation by Concha on the 31st of the same month. In a communiqué of April 1, 1902 to the Minister of Foreign Relations, the fears Concha harbored can be perceived:

The first thing that comes to mind in this respect, and especially because of the current political situation on the isthmus, is the imminent danger that a secession movement may arise in that region of the Republic, either spontaneously or through indirect suggestions from foreign interests, which would be a source of incalculable evils for the Republic. With the doors of the national territory closed to the United States in a spirit of hostility, they in retaliation would denounce, as the press has already proposed, the treaty of 1846, and once the commitments of that pact were broken, they would impassively watch the events that unfolded in Panama, in order then to occupy the territory at the first interruption of the railroad service or to welcome any tendency along the separatist path, by which one would arrive at an injury to Colombian sovereignty of far greater consequences than any limitation to which the republic might subject itself in the use of a given zone of its territory.

After the negotiation of some amendments, on April 23 Secretary Hay notified Concha that he was ready to sign the treaty as soon as Congress authorized the president to finalize the agreement and the Department of Justice concluded its investigation of the canal company's title.

Caricature titled "Go away, little man, and don't bother me", which appeared in the New York World in 1903, alluding to the negotiations between the United States and Colombia over the rights to the Isthmus of Panama, in which Roosevelt is shown aiming a cannon.

Although the Hay–Concha Treaty helped the approval of the Spooner Law, it had been viewed with suspicion by several senators who demanded additional amendments concerning the capacity of the U.S. to maintain courts of justice in the zone as well as a police force, and control over the laying of pipes, sewers and wastewater. They also demanded that the clause concerning the expropriation of the canal company be withdrawn, and absolute control in perpetuity instead of a lease over the zone.

On July 28, Secretary Hay sent Congress's additional amendments to Concha, who in turn communicated them to his government, urging it to reject them. Contrary to what Concha expected, on August 9 Marroquín ordered him to accept the proposal, but to demand a cash payment of $10,000,000 and $600,000 annually after 14 years.

On August 13 he received a similar communiqué from the Minister of Foreign Relations, confirming to him that the negotiations could not be interrupted, but that the treaty would have to be approved by Congress and that Colombia would set as a necessary condition the recovery of the par value of the 50,000 shares it held in the canal company.

In September 1902, the United States chargé d'affaires in Bogotá, Charles Burdett Hart, received a visit from Carlos Liévano, representing the Liberal Revolutionary Party, in which he requested the intervention of the United States to end the war in favor of the Liberals. One of his arguments was that if this happened, the country, mostly Liberal, would be willing to continue negotiating the canal treaty. Hart showed himself in favor of the proposal.

Warship Wisconsin, which would arrive in Panama on September 30, 1902, under the command of Admiral Silas Casey.

At that moment, the Liberals had defeated the troops of Marroquín in practically the entire national territory except in Panama, where the victory of approximately 7,000 men of the Liberal army over 3,000 of the government army was only a matter of time.

Three days later, Liébano returned to Hart's office, and Hart told him "It's all over. There is no longer a revolution". When Mr. Liébano asked the reason, Hart replied: "You know we have a canal to build".

Marroquín's son, Lorenzo Marroquín, together with Arístides Fernández, had already negotiated a pact for United States intervention to end the war on behalf of the Conservative Party, in power, pledging that the government would reach an agreement satisfactory to the United States in the canal treaty.

Concha, who was unaware of the reasons for the American intervention, received a cable from Marroquín on September 25, ordering him not to address the matter of the occupation. The minister firmly believed that the agreement of 1846 had been violated, since by sending its marines to Panama the U.S. had not only disarmed the revolutionary troops but had also prevented the movement and circulation of government troops. He also saw in this situation a sign of a probable annexation of Panama by the United States.

For Concha it was impossible to continue in his post, and after a copious exchange of communiqués with the Colombian government, on October 3 Concha wrote "I resign the legation for the fourth time. Tell the secretary to take charge.". On October 7 he received a reply: "Your resignation is unpatriotic and inadmissible."

Concha tried to resume the negotiations and focus on the matter of sovereignty. However, after some exchanges of opinions on the subject with Hay, and having sent his amendments to the treaty and obtained a revision in which the U.S. insisted on maintaining judicial and military privileges over the isthmus, he began to feel an aversion toward all the American negotiators, and this, added to his displeasure with the government he represented and his professed conviction not to negotiate while the U.S. occupation of the isthmus continued, led him to resign irrevocably on November 28, 1902.

Concha suffered a physical and emotional collapse after his resignation, and it was reported that he had to be put aboard a steamer in New York bound back to Colombia, restrained in a straitjacket.

Efforts of Dr. Tomás Herrán

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The new chargé d'affaires, Dr. Tomás Herrán, a career diplomat who had served as Secretary General of the Legation since its restoration in Washington, was the son of General Pedro Alcántara Herrán, who in the past had championed the ratification of the Mallarino–Bidlack Treaty.

Dr. Herrán, representing Colombia in Washington and negotiator of the Canal Treaty. 1903.

Marroquín would grant him plenipotentiary powers in a communiqué of December 11, 1902, in which he continued to press him to obtain the payment of $10,000,000 as compensation and the annuity of $600,000, or the best advantage he could negotiate, and asked Herrán to sign the treaty, placing on record that the U.S. was not willing to increase the offer, and stipulating that the treaty would have to be ratified by the Congress of Colombia.

In a series of exhausting conferences that Herrán held with Secretary Hay and Senators Hanna and Spooner before the end of the year, he obtained the following alternative offers:

1. Compensation of $7,000,000 with annuities of $100,000 after fourteen years.
2. Compensation of $10,000,000 with annuities of $10,000 after fourteen years.

Herrán sent the offers to the Colombian government, but it showed itself reluctant to accept them and delayed its reply.

In communiqués with the Minister of Foreign Relations, Felipe Paúl, Herrán expressed his concern about the separatist sentiments in Panama but saw the possibility of remedying them if a suitable treaty were obtained. He also expressed his fear that Roosevelt, on observing Colombia's resistance to accepting these terms, with his impetuous temperament, might seize Panama, using as justification the canal's character as a Universal Service of Public Interest.

On December 31, Mr. Herrán would reply to a cordial invitation to act from Secretary Hay, advocating the $10,000,000 compensation and proposing, in view of the great pecuniary difference between what was proposed by the U.S. and what was required by the government of Colombia, to defer the negotiation of the annuity to a later contract, bearing in mind that several years would intervene before the payment began to be made.

Soon Mr. Herrán's talent as a negotiator began to bear fruit, and on January 3, 1903, Secretary Hay agreed to Herrán's proposal, suggesting that they sign the treaty stipulating the $10,000,000 compensation, raising the annuity to $100,000, and leaving the door open for later negotiations on the annuity once the canal was finished, if circumstances should justify the increase of said rent.

Colombia shown as a bandit trying to rob Uncle Sam, demanding an outrageous sum for the rights to the isthmus. Harper's Weekly, November 21, 1903.

However, an event clouded the outlook that same day: the U.S. minister in Bogotá, Mr. Hart, notified his government that Colombia planned to claim additional compensation from the Compagnie Nouvelle before signing the treaty. As a result, Herrán was informed that the negotiations would have to be closed before March 4 and that the president, although he clearly favored the Panama route, might reconsider the Nicaragua route if a prompt agreement were not reached with Colombia.

Although Herrán had been educated in the U.S. and spoke fluent English, and although Secretary Hay and Cromwell were pleased with the new delegate, Herrán began to express his distrust of Cromwell and the Compagnie Nouvelle, owing to the friction that the opposing interests were beginning to generate. While recognizing Cromwell as a former ally of Colombia in selling the Panama canal project to the U.S., he also warned of the intrusion of Bunau-Varilla, who was sending cables and correspondence to people in the Colombian government.

In a cablegram sent by Marroquín on January 10, defined as a final instruction and received by Herrán on the 16th, the former stated that he understood that the amendments left by Concha had been accepted by the United States, and asked Herrán to negotiate greater monetary increases and a reduction in the term before the annuity took effect. He also instructed Herrán that, if he found it impossible to negotiate greater benefits and if the deal could be ruined by the passage of time, he should sign the treaty anyway.

In a letter from Herrán to Paúl dated January 22, 1903, the Colombian representative made clear to his government that the amendments of Concha, sent by him to Hay, did not even bear a date of receipt, so that the negotiations had been suspended; he added that in a conference with President Roosevelt, he had told him that he would sign the treaty if necessary, but that he would place on record his disagreement with the amount stipulated for the annuity.

On January 22, Hay sent Herrán an ultimatum informing him that the reasonable time contemplated by the Spooner statute had expired and that President Roosevelt had approved increasing the annuity to $250,000 after 9 years, and that he was not authorized to consider or discuss any further change.

That same day, at nightfall, the Hay–Herrán Treaty was signed at Secretary Hay's house on Lafayette Square. Cromwell, the only person present besides the signatories, kept the pen with which it was signed as a souvenir of the goal achieved.

Months later, owing to the rejection of the treaty by the Colombian Congress and to the constant affronts to which he would be subjected by his government, Herrán fell into a state of severe depression. When he left Washington for New York with his family, he was also suffering from a worrying physical condition. He died on August 30, 1904, at the Loomis Sanitarium, Liberty, New York.

Text of the treaty

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The treaty is divided into 28 articles without higher-level divisions, and has a prior, unilateral annex composed of 8 articles. The introduction places the contracting parties in time and space, making clear the fundamental purpose of the article: to ensure the construction of a ship canal that will connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In this sense, the treaty defines itself as bilateral, binding and sovereignly signed, as it is concluded between duly accredited plenipotentiaries.

Structure and content of the articles

Articles 1 to 5 establish the transfer of obligations by the Colombian government to an ad hoc company, which must acquire the construction concession by lawful payment, respecting the public shares previously acquired. An extraordinary transfer is made, for a century, of the exploitation rights exclusively over the canal to the United States, a country that takes responsibility for its maintenance and administration and reserves the right to expand or build, as well as to extend the concession unilaterally for a period equal to that originally agreed. The treaty establishes that the United States must abide by respect for Colombian sovereignty. These articles provide a legal context under which both parties agree.

Thereafter, Articles 6 to 12 establish the local conditions guaranteed for the proper course of the concession. The Colombian government divests itself of territorial sovereignty by agreeing to refrain from leasing to third parties key geographic points that could hinder the operation of the canal, and it permits the unrestricted local exploitation of natural resources at the cost of free benefit for Colombian nationals, as well as the American obligation to compensate for damages caused by works related to the canal. The Colombian government undertakes not to obstruct the transit and settlement of foreigners entering the country as part of the personnel related to the canal.

Depiction of the damages caused by the construction, which would be compensated by the United States according to the text of the treaty. New York Herald, December 1903.

Articles 12 to 19 also establish the commercial conditions between the two parties. American imports free of customs duties are permitted, provided they are for consumption in the vicinity of the canal. In addition, Colombia permits the United States to protect all commercial routes related to the canal, using the necessary lawful means. The divestment of sovereignty includes the establishment of American courts to settle conflicts in the zone, as well as the formation of a mixed tribunal to try civil cases and similar ones. The possibility is left open of creating laws according to the needs of the zone. The right of expropriation of property on grounds of public interest is affirmed, subject to unappealable compensation. In addition, the United States is permitted to use all Colombian port terminals for the protection and landing of its ships for the purpose of benefiting or benefiting from the canal. Responsibility for coercion for the sake of compliance with the treaty rests entirely on the United States.

As a consequence of the international benefit of the canal, the remaining articles establish the conditions under which third States will be governed. The first Colombian commitment is to unilaterally denounce any agreement with a third State that contravenes the treaty signed below; any claim arising from breach of an agreement as a consequence of the execution of the present one shall be presented to and resolved by the Colombian government without affecting the United States. It is established that the Colombian government must protect the canal militarily, but that, should it not be effective in that defense, the United States may use force on Colombian territory to safeguard common interests.

The final articles set deadlines, amounts and special conditions that make possible the viable execution of the agreements signed. The procedure for ratification and deposit of the treaty is established, as well as its entry into force.

Annexed to the articles is an internal American authorization for the negotiation and acquisition of the agreement. This document simply contributes to the legitimation of the treaty as an international legal document.

Rejection of the treaty

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On August 5, 1903, at 10 in the morning, the new United States ambassador to Colombia, Mr. Arthur Matthias Beaupré, reported the rejection of the treaty, informing Secretary Hay of the objections that the Colombian Congress had presented, which are detailed below.

Number	Amendment
First.	In the preamble, the references to the Spooner Law shall be deleted.
Second.	In Article 1 the condition shall be introduced that the Panama Railroad and the Canal Company shall be obliged beforehand to make agreements with the Colombian government, in which the conditions shall be established under which that government will give the necessary consent to allow these companies to transfer their rights to the United States. It shall be made explicit that Colombia will recover ownership of all land concessions currently in the possession of said companies, without the exception of any such lands, so that the cities of Panama and Colón may be effectively and totally excluded from the zone that is the subject of the concession.
Third.	The clauses of Articles 2 and 3 shall be modified in such a way as to express clearly that Colombia grants the United States only the right to the use of the zone and part of the adjacent territory. It must be expressed precisely that the rights granted to the United States are in the nature of a lease, eliminating the idea of ownership, which establishes in a peremptory manner the perpetuity of the concession. The boundary of the zone shall be indicated with the greatest precision, and the necessary properties to which the concession extends shall be clearly determined, unequivocally excluding from the concession the cities of Panama and Colón; in addition to which it shall be indicated that the guarantee of the treaty of 1846–1848 shall not be modified in any way whatsoever, and shall continue in force throughout the department of Panama, including the zone.
Fourth.	In Article 7, the concession of the right of free usufruct of the waters of the lakes, lagoons, rivers, and of all non-navigable waters, whether natural or artificial, that may be devoted to supplying the canal or auxiliary canals, or that may be used during its construction, maintenance, or operation, shall be clearly defined, so that they may be diverted from their course, raised or lowered in their levels, converted into lakes, widened or narrowed if necessary, for such purposes. It shall be established that this right is exclusive only insofar as it refers to the usufruct of such waters for the supply and maintenance of the canal or of the auxiliary canals, without allowing the concessions to prevent the use of such waters by third parties by virtue of their legitimate rights for any purpose other than navigation and that does not disturb, hinder, or impair the use that the United States may wish to make of such waters for the aforesaid purposes. The use of waters or rivers outside the canal zone for the transport of materials, etc., shall not be an exclusive right of the United States, but they are granted the right to use the waters, without tax or charge of any kind, provided that the use is related to the maintenance and operations of the concession. The ownership of the natural resources of the Republic that the United States may require for the work shall be determined as precisely as possible, limiting this concession to the department of Panama, and determining that the compensation that may be due under Article 7 shall in all cases be in accordance with what Article 14 stipulates.
Fifth.	In Article 8, the uncertainty of the clause under which no duty shall be collected in the cities of Panama and Colón, except on merchandise intended to be introduced for consumption in the rest of the Republic, shall be corrected.
Sixth.	In Article 13, everything referring to the establishment of United States courts and the application of United States laws within Colombian territory shall be deleted, since this contradicts Article 10 of the constitution, and it shall be established that the sanitary and police regulations that will be in force in the zone must be subject to an agreement between the two governments.
Seventh.	The compensation that the concession mentions in Article 14, which regulates the expropriations that may come to be carried out in the cases mentioned in the same article, shall be settled and paid by the United States, according to the valuation at the time.
Eighth.	In Article 24 a forfeiture clause shall be introduced stipulating the deadline, which, if exceeded, and if the work has not been executed, all concessions shall cease to exist and all properties and rights of the enterprise shall revert to Colombia. The last paragraph of Article 25, which begins "But no delay", shall be deleted.
Ninth.	An additional clause must indicate the tribunal that is to decide on any differences that may arise between the contracting parties regarding compliance with the treaty.

The Hay–Herrán Treaty was officially abolished on September 2, 1903, when the law approving its rejection was issued.

At a dinner in Panama in 1907, during an official visit by U.S. Senator Duncan E. McKinlay, the latter held a conversation with Panama's Minister of Government Tomás Arias and asked him his opinion on the reasons why the Hay–Herrán Treaty had been rejected after it had been tentatively agreed upon by the Colombian authorities. Minister Arias's explanation revolved around four reasons why the Hay–Herrán Treaty was rejected in its discussion in the Colombian Senate.

Caricature from the Sunday Times of 1903, showing Phillipe Bunau-Varilla as the true man behind the emancipation of Panama and the first beneficiary of the transaction transferring the French Canal Company into U.S. hands.

• In the first place, German influence was strong in Colombia, and German merchants and diplomats were in open opposition to the extension of American influence along the west coast of South America, particularly in the Colombian republic. The German merchants, seeing the collapse of the French Canal Company almost accomplished, hoped that the German Company could buy the remnants of the French enterprise and bring the canal to a successful conclusion, recognizing how much this stage would mean on the path of German aggrandizement.
• The second influence, according to Minister Arias, was that of the management of the old transcontinental railroad of the United States. When the popular clamor to obtain the isthmian canal had cleared away all obstruction in Washington, D.C., the management moved its theater of operations to Bogotá, and the influence and money of the railroad were probably used to induce some of the senators to vote against ratification of the treaty.
• The third influence was that of patriotism. Some of the Colombian senators were reluctant to transfer any portion of Colombian soil to a foreign power, all the more so considering that the Colombian constitution contained a clause that made a traitor of any Colombian who took part in the alienation of any part of Colombian territory to another country.
• The fourth and most important influence was the fact that the French Canal Company had failed in every commitment to fulfill the terms of its contract with the Colombian government. Not only had it failed to finish the canal within the specified period, but on obtaining an extension of that period, it had been unable to keep the terms under which the extension had been secured. Therefore the Colombian government could very properly seek its expropriation, which could be achieved by following due process of law in somewhat less than ten months.

Many of the Colombian senators took the position that it would be legal and more advantageous to declare the expropriation of the French Company and take control of the canal in accordance with such expropriation in the manner provided for by the franchise. The Republic of Colombia would then be in a position to sell it to the American government for forty million dollars, and given that it then had ten million dollars assured for the zone and its rental in perpetuity for a considerable annuity, the financial condition of the country could improve substantially. As the finances of the Republic of Colombia were at that moment in a desperately depleted condition, this prospect of their rehabilitation must have had a powerful effect on many of the senators.

These four circumstantial reasons undoubtedly caused the Colombian Senate to reject ratification of the Hay–Herrán Treaty.

See also

• Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty
• Isthmus of Panama
• Panama Canal
• Panama Canal Zone
• Separation of Panama from Colombia

Bibliography

• United States, House (1913). The Story of Panama: Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Committe of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. Washington: Government printing office. p. 755.
• Bunau-Varilla, Philippe (1914). Panama. The Creation, Destruction, and Resurrection. New York: McBride, Nast & Company. pp. 571.
• Castillero R., Ernesto J. (1933). La causa inmediata de la emancipación de Panamá : Historia de los orígenes, la formación y el rechazo por el Senado colombiano, del tratado Herrán-Hay (in español). Panamá: Academia Panameña de la historia. p. 433.
• McCullough, David (1977). The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of The Panama Canal. 1870-1914. New York: Simon & Schuster. pp. 702. ISBN 0-671-22563-4. ISBN 0671225634.
• Herrán, Tomás (1985). La Crisis De Panamá : Cartas de Tomás Herrán 1900-1904 (in español). Compiled by: Dodd, Thomas J. Bogotá: Banco de la República. pp. 454. ISBN 958-9028-16-0.
• Beluche, Olmedo (2003). La Verdadera Historia de La Separación de 1903. Reflexiones en Torno al Centenario (in español). Panamá: Imprenta ARTICSA. ISBN 9962-02-358-0.
• Díaz Espino, Ovidio (2004). El país creado por Wall Street : la historia no contada de Panamá (in español). Translated by: García, Angela. Bogotá : Ed. Planeta Colombiano, c2003. pp. 272. ISBN 958-42-0529-3, 9789584205292. ISBN 9584205293, 9789584205292. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
• Araúz, Celestino A. (2006). Un sueño de siglos: El Canal de Panamá, Revista Tareas no. 123.CELA, Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos (in español). Panamá: Justo Arosemena. ISSN 0494-7061.